I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, economists have begun using Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) surveys to estimate the value of public goods produced by sports and to determine what factors influence individual willingness to pay for sports public goods.
They have estimated the willingness to pay for public goods resulting from the construction of a new basketball arena for a Division I power in National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball and from the construction of a stadium to attract a minor league baseball team to a small city (Johnson and Whitehead, 2000) ; the willingness to pay for public goods generated by a National Hockey League (NHL) team (Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead, 2001) ; and the willingness to pay to keep a National Football League (NFL) team and to build an arena to attract a National Basketball Association team (Johnson, Mondello, and Whitehead, forthcoming) . In all cases, the willingness to pay fell far short of the subsidies required to build an arena or stadium in order to keep or attract a team. Coupled with the widely held consensus that sports stadiums and teams result in negligible effects on employment, tax revenues, and income (Baade and Dye, 1990; Baim, 1994; Coates and Humphreys, 2000; 2003; Fainstein and Stokes, 1990; Hudson, 1999; Humphreys, 2001; Rosentraub, 1997) , the CVM studies reinforce the conclusion that the subsidies given to most major league teams, stadiums, and arenas do not improve economic efficiency.
The published CVM studies of sports public goods have all focused on willingness to pay for professional or major-college spectator sports, all of which are subject to monopolistic restrictions on supply. The emphasis on big-time spectator sports has obscured the fact that governments also subsidize many other sporting activities, including amateur athletics and recreation programs. Funding sources also extend beyond the conventional taxes posited in the hypothetical scenarios in the earlier CVM studies, including revenues from sources such as gambling. 1 While amateur sporting activities do not confer major league status on their communities, they may nevertheless instill pride and unity in a community. The option to participate in a variety of sports and recreation activities may enhance the quality of life in a community even for people who choose not to exercise the option. An example would be the sporting culture associated with cities such as Melbourne, Australia. In addition, the existence of organized sports activities may produce positive externalities by keeping adolescents under adult supervision and off the street and potentially foster qualities such as sportsmanship, teamwork, and leadership. It may also improve the health and well being of participants and reduce health care costs. This paper extends in two important dimensions the literature on the valuation of sports public goods. First, while previous studies have focused on professional spectator sports, the current paper looks at local, amateur, participatory sports and recreation programs in Canada, where opportunities to participate may provide public goods benefits to communities and the funding for which has traditionally come from public sources. Second, the paper incorporates moral norms and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) into a Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) study, thus extending the methodology of earlier studies. According to the TPB, an individual's behavior depends upon his or her intention to perform a behavior which, in turn, is determined by: (a) the person's attitudes toward the behavior, e.g., is it enjoyable, or is it wise; (b) the subjective 1 For the purposes of our discussion, the terms gambling and gaming will be used interchangeably. norms he or she believes significant others have concerning the behavior; (c) his or her perception of whether the behavior can be performed. Coupling TPB and CVM questions on the same survey allows estimation of the impact of moral norms on willingness to pay. This is critical where public funds are used to support programs such as amateur sport and recreation programs where the public may have a range of participatory experiences.
Over the past 15 years, the TPB has been used to explain people's participation in a variety of leisure activities, including gambling (Oh and Hsu, 2001; Sheeran and Obell, 1999; Walker, Courneya, and Deng, 2006) .
In addition, the source of funds to provide public subsidies may also influence opinions of their appropriateness. For example, the programs examined in this paper, located throughout the province of Alberta, Canada, are supported in part by the Alberta Lottery Fund. Because gambling carries moral baggage that income and sales taxes do not, the TPB brings added insight to the evaluation of funding for sports public goods, and to the use of gambling proceeds to fund other government programs, as well. The results below indicate that moral norms about gambling do affect willingness to pay for sports and, in comparison to previous studies, also show a much larger willingness to pay for broad-based participatory sports and recreation activities than for big-time professional spectator sports. For context, the paper first describes the Canadian amateur sport and recreation system and the role of gambling in funding those programs.
II. CANADIAN AMATEUR SPORT SYSTEM
The development of elite athletes for international competitions such as the Olympics is the jurisdiction of the federal government, which funds the national-level organizations that oversee specific sports (Pitter, 1996) . In contrast, provincial governments play a much larger role in providing opportunities for non-elite athletes.
Each sport and recreational activity is represented at the provincial level by a Provincial Sport Organization (PSO) or a Provincial Recreation Association (PRA). There are currently 78 PSOs and 27 PRAs in Alberta. These associations, and the amateur clubs they serve, can receive funding from gaming. They represent activities from Alpine skiing to yoga. 
III. CANADIAN GAMBLING AND SPORTS AND RECREATION PROGRAMS
The use of gaming revenues to support amateur sport and recreation programs in Alberta, while similar to other Commonwealth countries, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Gaming law in Canada has its roots in early 19 th century English statutory law, which never considered gambling illegal and never prohibited private bets between individuals. Perhaps as a result, gambling in Canada is more widely accepted than in countries with more puritanical views (Seelig and Seeling, 1998) .
Canadian government revenues from gaming were negligible until the federal government created a national lottery in 1970 to help fund the 1976 Summer Olympic
Games in Montreal (Campbell and Smith, 1998) . By 1975 the federal government had licensed several prominent charities to operate casinos outside of the traditional summer period (Smith, Williams, and Pitter, 1987) . Ten years later, the provinces had become the sole legal providers and regulators of gambling, operating their own gaming enterprises and licensing charities to do so (Azmier and Roach, 2000) . Once provinces gained control of gaming operations, each developed its own unique approach to the expansion of gaming schemes and the allocation of profits from their operations.
In no Canadian province has gambling flourished more than in Alberta. (Azmier, 2005) . In 2003-04, the Alberta government collected gaming profits of $474 per adult, highest in Canada and much higher than the national average of $262 (Azmier, 2005) .
Despite the importance of gaming in Canada, some opponents, particularly religious groups, criticize it as immoral and unproductive (Azmier and Roach, 2000) . In one study, only one third of Canadian charities reported using gaming as a source of funding over the five-year period 1995-1999. Sixty-three percent of the organizations not using gambling money said that "ethical concerns" contributed to their decisions not to use it. Ninety percent of religious groups expressed ethical concerns, as did 34 percent of non-religious groups (Azmier and Roach, 2000) . In addition, 58 percent of respondents in the same survey who did use gaming funds said that they would have preferred not to, but needed the money (Azmier and Roach, 2000) . In other words, a reliance on gaming revenues has potential conflicts with the moral norms of members of these organizations.
However, "Despite the intensity of feeling expressed by some about gambling….[a Canadian] national survey found that 63 percent agreed that gambling is acceptable…. reducing the overall tax burden, providing a source of entertainment, having important economic development benefits, and funding worthwhile causes" (Azmier and Roach, 2000, p. 4) . In addition, some gaming schemes are less objectionable than others, with raffles and bingos considered "most acceptable" and slot machines and
VLTs the least (Azmier and Roach, 2000, p. 15) .
As a result, the use of gaming revenues has become a "necessary evil" for groups such as sport and recreation organizations in Alberta that rely on gaming revenues to The fourth section contained the heart of the survey, the contingent valuation section. Two hypothetical scenarios were presented to respondents, one concerning the arts and one concerning sports. The sports scenario said the Alberta government was considering proposals to expand amateur sport and recreation programs, but to do so would require an increase in the provincial income tax. Respondents were first asked whether they support the idea of expanding programs with higher income taxes. The first question did not mention the degree of expansion or the size of the tax increase. If they said they support or strongly support an increase in taxes the dichotomous variable SUPPORT equals 1. Then they were informed that the rise in income taxes would be $10, $25, or $50 per year-each respondent was given just one figure-which would be enough to raise participation rates in sport and recreation programs by either 2 percent or 10 percent. Because the tax amount and participation rates were mixed and matched, six different combinations were presented to respondents. They were then asked whether they believed such an increase in participation rates could be achieved. If they responded very likely or somewhat likely then they accepted the scenario as plausible. If they responded unlikely, they did not accept the scenario.
Next, respondents were told to suppose that the proposal were put to a referendum. They were reminded that if the referendum passed, they would have $TAX less to spend on other things each year. They were asked whether they would vote for or against the proposal. Next they were asked to rate how certain they were, on a 10-point scale, that they would vote for the proposal if it really were put to a referendum. If they rated their certainty at 7 or higher, then FOR takes a value of 1. If they rated their certainty 6 or lower, their response was recoded as being against the referendum, despite their claim they would vote for it. This is done to reduce hypothetical bias.
A similar scenario about the arts was presented to respondents. Half of those surveyed were first asked about the sport and recreation programs, while half were first asked about the arts and cultural programs.
The fifth section asked questions about their activity as a participant, official, volunteer, or parent of a participant with Alberta sport and recreation programs and Alberta arts and culture programs. They were also asked to identify, from a list of 21 options, which gambling activities they had participated in within the last 12 months.
The activities ranged from buying a variety of lottery tickets, to playing video lottery or slots machines, visiting casinos, to placing bets with bookies. Finally, they were asked demographic questions about their age, education, employment, income, and religion, including their religious denomination and the importance of religion in their lives. To create a moral norms variable, we sum the responses to these three questions.
The scale variable MORAL is increasing in moral resistance to using gambling money to fund amateur sport and recreation. It ranges from 3 to 15, with 45 percent of the responses at the lowest level of 3. Definitions and descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis appear in Tables I and II. Insert Table 1 about here  Insert Table 2 about here A Tobit model with the censoring threshold set at 3 is used to estimate the determinants of moral norms. Independent variables include sex, whether the respondent lives in a rural place, income, lottery participation, and importance of religion. All 926 complete cases were used. The results appear in Table III .
Insert Table 3 The only variable positively associated with moral qualms was religion. As the importance of religion increases, so does moral resistance to using gambling money.
More than 60 percent of the sample said that religion is somewhat or very important in their lives. Twenty percent say religion is unimportant in their lives and claim no religious affiliation.
Place of residence has no effect on moral norms. Rural residents hold the same norms, ceteris paribus, as residents of Calgary and Edmonton.
Support for Using Gambling Funds and Income Taxes
The next stage of the analysis examines the impact of moral norms on support for using gambling revenue to fund sport and recreation programs. It also looks at the impact of gambling moral norms on support for the idea of using higher income taxes to expand sport and recreation programs. Probit models are used to estimate the impact of moral norms on support for using income taxes. Table IV summarizes the survey responses and shows the probit results.
Insert Table 4 about here Gambling appears to be a far more popular source of funding. About two-thirds of respondents support the Alberta Lottery Fund's use of gambling money to fund amateur sport and recreation while just a little more than one-fourth support the use of income taxes.
We use a probit model to determine the effects of moral norms on support for using gaming money. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondent strongly or slightly supports the ALF's use of gambling money to fund amateur sport and recreation and 0 otherwise. To control for possible endogeneity bias we use the predicted value from the moral norms Tobit model in Table III as an independent variable. Since religious importance and lottery use are uncorrelated with the remaining dependent variables, they act as instrumental variables to identify the predicted moral norms variable.
The results appear in Table IV , columns A and B. The greater the moral qualms about using gambling money the less likely respondent will support using gambling funds to pay for sport and recreation programs. No other explanatory variable affects support for using lottery money. Apparently, the only factor that keeps lottery money from being universally popular as a funding source is the moral qualms some feel.
The results for the model on support of the idea of higher income taxes to expand participation rates differ markedly. The results appear in columns C and D of Table IV. Increasing moral qualms about using gambling money are associated with increasing support for income taxes to pay for sport and recreation. All other variables are significant, too. Males and Albertans outside Calgary and Edmonton are more likely to back the idea of raising income taxes.
Ordering effects appear in the results. If respondents were asked first about sport and recreation rather than arts and culture, they were less likely to say they support higher income taxes for sports.
Willingness to Pay
With the application of standard CVM techniques, the survey data can reveal whether people are willing to pay for an enhancement of a public good. The following WTP model for sport and recreation programs in Alberta was estimated with a probit model:
WTP = f($TAX, SCOPE, FIRST, MALE, RURAL, INCOME, MORAL)
where $TAX is the annual increase in income tax the respondent was asked to pay, SCOPE is the percentage-point increase in participation, FIRST is a dummy variable indicating whether the sport and recreation scenario was presented first, and the other variables are defined as before. Table V presents three different estimations of the WTP model. Because the percentage of yes votes was at or below 50 percent at each bid amount, we use the natural log of $TAX to constrain estimated WTP to be positive. In Model 1, for all respondents who said they were willing to pay higher taxes in the amount asked, the dependent variable FOR was coded as 1. This is true for all cases, even if they said they were uncertain that they would actually vote yes in a real referendum. The estimated household WTP in Model 1 is $11.22 per year per household.
Insert Table 5 But even after recoding FOR, Model 2 may not reflect true WTP for enhanced sport and recreation programs. Forty-four percent of respondents do not accept the hypothetical scenario-they think it unlikely that the increased participation rate can be achieved with the proposed tax increase. Even supporters of increased participation won't want to pay for futile efforts to increase it.
Model 3 presents WTP estimates using only the 514 observations of those who believe the stated participation rates can be achieved with the increased funding. The dependent variable is coded in Model 3 as it is in Model 2, so that only people who are fairly certain of their yes votes are counted in favor of the proposal. The estimated WTP rises to $16.98 and is highly significant.
Because it corrects for hypothetical bias and scenario acceptance, Model 3 is preferred. As predicted by economic theory, the probability of a yes vote falls as the tax amount increases. Rural residents are less willing to pay than are residents of Edmonton and Calgary. The effect of income is positive but just misses being statistically significant. Moral norms have a negative, but statistically insignificant impact. Neither the scope of the policy (i.e., the participation rate) nor the ordering of the sports and recreation scenario has an effect on the votes.
VI. BIVARIATE PROBIT ESTIMATIONS
The results in Model 3 of Table V , while compensating for hypothetical bias and scenario acceptance, may nevertheless be biased. The willingness to pay for enhanced programs could be correlated with unobserved variables that are also correlated with support of the payment vehicle, an increase in income tax rates. The unobserved variables may be related to TPB, attitudes toward gambling and taxes, moral norms, and the like.
To estimate the household willingness to pay, we use a bivariate probit model where the dependent variables are support for the idea of expanding programs and the willingness to vote for a specific tax increase. In the first equation we specify the willingness to vote for a specific tax increase. In the second we specify the support for the idea of using higher income taxes for sport and recreation programs.
where π(.) is the probability function, FOR indicates a willingness to vote for the referendum, SUPPORT indicates support for the idea of higher income taxes, $TAX is the increase in annual income taxes, SCOPE is the increase in participation rates, MORAL is the moral norms variable, FIRST indicates whether the sport scenario or the arts scenario was read to respondents first, DEMO is a vector of demographic variables, and Ф(.) is the standard normal density function. A bivariate probit is appropriate if the correlation between error terms, ρ, is statistically significant. If unobservable characteristics affecting support for the idea of higher taxes are correlated with unobservable characteristics affecting the support for a particular referendum then the correlation between error terms will be statistically significant.
The results of the bivariate probit estimation appear in Table VI . They are broadly consistent with the probit results in Table V . However, the WTP estimate in Model 2 is now significantly different from zero, though still tiny. The WTP estimate for Model 3 is $18.33, approximately the same as in the probit model and is estimated more efficiently. Because Model 3 accounts for scenario acceptance, it is the preferred model.
The qualitative results are essentially the same as in the probit model in Table V .
Insert Table 6 about here In the WTP model, gambling moral norms have no effect on willingness to pay.
But in the model reported in Table IV , support for the idea of using the income tax to fund sports is positively related to moral norms. These seemingly contradictory results suggest that an increased income tax to fund amateur sports and recreation programs might receive political support from those opposed to using gambling funds. However, this support would not be enough for the referendum to pass. This is not surprising since only about a third of the sample oppose the use of gambling funds.
VII. COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS RESULTS
In 1997, residents of metropolitan Pittsburgh were surveyed for a CVM study (Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead, 2001 ). They were asked how much they would be willing to pay to avoid losing their NHL team, the Penguins, to another city. Compared to their annual WTP of $5.57 per household for a high profile, major league team, the annual Alberta WTP of $18.33 for amateur sports may seem high, especially when considering that the Pittsburgh WTP was to avoid a complete loss of the Penguins, while the Alberta figure is just for an increase in participation of a few percentage points.
Several factors make the difference appear larger than it is. First, the Pittsburgh WTP is in US dollars while the Alberta WTP is in Canadian dollars. As this is being written, the household WTP. Table VII shows the net present value of aggregated household WTP, discounted at 4, 5, and 6 percent in perpetuity, using the annual bivariate probit estimate of WTP from Model 3.
Insert Table 7 about here
The upper bound figures in Table VII Table VI , though it is impossible to say whether the true value is closer to the upper or lower bound.
The net present values in Table VI appear at first glance to be much larger than the discounted WTPs for professional sports teams and stadiums in the United States revealed by previous CVM studies. For instance, the 95 percent confidence interval for the discounted WTP for the Pittsburgh Penguins of the National Hockey League in 1997 was $23.5 million to $66 million (Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead, 2001 Discounting the Alberta figures at 8 percent would reduce aggregate NPV by half of the 4 percent NPV and by 25 percent of the 6 percent NPV.
The WTP for the Jacksonville Jaguars revealed by a 2002 CVM survey also appears much lower at first glance (Johnson, Mondello, and Whitehead, forthcoming) .
The upper and lower bound aggregate WTPs for the Jaguars were $35.8 million and $13.3 million, discounted at 7 percent. Again, adjusting for inflation and exchange rates, discounting at a lower interest rate, and accounting for the fact the Jacksonville has only about one -third as many households as Alberta reduces the disparity in aggregate WTPs.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The results do not allow a decomposition of WTP into use value and non-use value components, so how much of the WTP is for public goods cannot be determined. SCOPE number of percentage points participation in sport and recreation programs was supposed to increase by if the hypothetical tax increase were to occur.
FIRST 1 if respondent heard the sport and recreation hypothetical scenario before the art and culture scenario $TAX the number of dollars by which the respondent's annual income tax would rise if the hypothetical referendum were to pass 
